The club have been reviewing their security procedures with Greater Manchester Police following terror attacks in Manchester, London and Paris in recent months. United have emailed season ticket holders with details of the new measures; there will now be enhanced searches of fans at turnstiles which ‘may take longer and as a result it is likely that queues will also be longer’. The size of bags allowed will also be reduced.
Supporters are being advised not to bring a bag larger than a small handbag (20cm x 15cm x 5cm) with them or they will have to leave it in a bag drop zone.
‘All bags will be searched and items larger than the size criteria must be left at one of the bag drop facilities, which are located near the ticket office and in E2 car park,’ an email sent on Friday read.
‘Bringing a bag will further delay your entry to the stadium (and will delay your departure after the game if you have to use a bag drop) and we therefore encourage you not to bring any bags or prohibited items to the stadium (if you have to bring a bag, we recommend you arrive at least two hours before kick-off).
‘Please do not be alarmed by the extra security measures (which will be in place for every match from now on), they are to ensure your time at Old Trafford is as safe as possible.’
The club also reminded season ticket holders that major roadworks on key roads surrounding the stadium have begun and will last for three years.
‘This will increase your journey time to and from the stadium if you travel by car and could impact your route and street parking,’ the memo added. As always, turnstiles will still open two hours before-kick off . For more details, visit www.manutd.com/gettinghere.
I ve got a confession to make . I ve never written a line of code in my life . Consequently I haven t the faintest idea how hacking works . So on that basis I m surely the last person who could come up with a cyber security presentation. Not necessarily, because the typical cyber security presentation goes something like this:
There are more threats than ever . There are those who have been hacked, and those who don t know they ve been hacked . And your people are the weakest link .
Cue some stories about password idiocy . Move on to conclude that security is very difficult, but we all have to try harder. This may sound cynical, but that isn t the intention . All the above is true, and needs saying . But its repetition sometimes feels as if it marks a more uncomfortable truth: as we look around at such conferences, the real threat sits between us.
The media supply chain is as weak as its least secure company; but we are struggling to find a way to help each other become more secure – Mark Harrison
In many ways this difficulty is hardly surprising . No one wants to admit to vulnerability in their processes or products. Making operations or products more secure may not make them easier to work with . And, for all that it is now digital and connected, the media industry remains a peculiar mix of the highly technical and the highly personal: if media production was reduced to a set of automated, encrypted processes, creativity would be killed stone dead. At a DPP event at IBC2016, BBC Chief Technology and Product Officer, Matthew Postgate observed: The good guys need to work together – because you can be sure the bad guys are.
The banks have already learnt this lesson .
It s very important that suppliers and customers are clear and honest in sharing information . The best thing the BBC did was admit to ourselves and our supplier base where we really were on security . We all need to be explicit. Matthew Postgate s comments resonated with the lead already taken by the North American Broadcasters Association (NABA). They had drawn up a set of basic cyber security requirements for all suppliers working with broadcasters .
The list was published at IBC 2016 in partnership with the DPP. And a couple of months later, NABA brought the industry together in New York for a ground breaking international cyber security symposium . That symposium surfaced the reality: that the media industry is now a prime target for increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks, but we lack a coordinated means of response . We need to find a way of getting the good guys together. So earlier this year the DPP gathered subject matter experts in security from across its membership.
There was unanimous agreement that the industry needed to create some common best practice . At the request of its members, the DPP took the NABA/DPP Broadcaster Cyber Security Requirements for Suppliers, and turned it into a more formal checklist against which any supplier in the broadcast and distribution chain can comply themselves. The intention is to introduce this checklist into the UK in the first instance . It is hoped that with time the DPP can use its international reach to spread this approach beyond the UK, and that a community of like minded broadcasters, distributors and suppliers can help cascade best practice in a way that is manageable and affordable.
What s innovative about the Broadcaster Cyber Security Requirements document is that it isn t a simple pass/fail . It is designed to enable suppliers to document their current activity around security even if that means acknowledging areas where they have issues. Those issues might even be created by their broadcaster customers ! The intention is to acknowledge that vulnerabilities shift on a day by day basic, but demonstrate a commitment to security one that shows it is front of mind, pro-active and ambitious for excellence .
Ultimately no one can ask for more. The DPP Broadcaster Cyber Security1 checklist builds on a similar one created for the production and post production community, which also enables them and their suppliers to self-assess against a number of key security criteria while respecting the reality that the needs and challenges of every production vary. At IBC2017 the first companies will be announcing their adoption of the DPP checklist approach.
And in a special session in the IBC conference I will be exploring this collaborative approach to security further, with colleagues from across the whole supply chain .
And that s the paradox of security: our expert colleagues who understand hacking can fight off the bad guys; but they ll only be effective if we give them the means to work together.
SYDNEY (Reuters) – Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said on Tuesday Australia’s domestic security bodies, including the police and the national spy agency, will be centralised under a single minister as Canberra tackles the rising threat of “lone wolf” attacks.
Oversight of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the police force had previously been the responsibility of three government officials but would now be handled by Immigration Minister Peter Dutton, Turnbull said, under a model similar to that used by the British Home Office.
Turnbull said the centralised model would ensure greater coordination between Australia’s security agencies.
The national security overhaul came as Australia, a staunch ally of the United States, reshapes its counter-terrorism response after a series of lone-wolf attacks and heightened fear of attacks by home-grown militants returning from fighting in the Middle East.
“Our security environment is being shaped by changes in our region and beyond,” Turnbull told reporters in Canberra.
“It is being shaped by the very real threat of home-grown terrorism that is increased with the spread of global Islamist terrorism,” he said.
The Cabinet shake-up came a day after Turnbull said Australia’s military would be more readily deployed to respond to “terrorist incidents” at home.
Under those proposed law changes, state and territory governments would be able to call for military help at any time after a “terror incident” has been declared .
Previously, the military could only be called upon once police concluded they could no longer deal with an incident.
Australia’s domestic security policies have come under close scrutiny since a lone gunman staged a 16-hour siege at a Sydney cafe in December 2014, during which two hostages were killed.
A coronial inquiry found in May that police failed to respond quickly enough to end the siege, which has been described as Australia’s deadliest incident inspired by Islamic State extremists .
The gunman, who was killed by police, had no direct ties to the militant group.
Reporting by Colin Packham; Editing by Paul Tait